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YOU SPEAK AN “INFINITE DEAL OF
NOTHING”*: PRIORITIZING FREE SPEECH
OVER OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
JACQUELINE AHEARN†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are a young woman, alone on the sidewalk
walking toward a Planned Parenthood or similar clinic. Although
there are any number of reasons from breast cancer to STD testing
to go to such a clinic, you are there for an abortion. Hopefully, you
have a support group of friends, family, or loved ones, but it is
entirely possible you do not. And as you approach the clinic doors,
a crowd of protestors you have been eyeing apprehensively grows
louder and closer, jeering and gesturing.
When you get close enough to hear their words, you realize they
are screaming at you about your baby, the fetus growing inside
you. It is entirely likely that the facts they are shouting are
incorrect, but it is also likely that you do not know enough to know
that. You probably never thought you would be here, now,
wondering if it was true that the fetus you carried had eyelashes
after just 4 weeks, like the sign you just passed says.1
Once your destination is clear, they crowd you. They never
touch you, never even block your path, but you stop because even
though you could squeeze between the young man holding
pamphlets and the elderly woman brandishing a sign, you feel
*WILLIAM

SHAKESPEARE, THE COMPLETE PELICAN SHAEKSPEARE 294. “The Merchant of
Venice”, Act I, Scene I, line 115.
†Candidate for J.D. 2016, St. John’s School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, Political Science
and English, University of South Carolina, May 2013.
1 RICHARD E. JONES & KRISTIN H. LOPEZ, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 273 (3d ed.
2006) (stating the fetus develops eyelashes around 24 weeks. A generous person may
attribute the incorrect sign to a typo, though anti-choice protestors do sometimes use
intentionally misleading or false information).
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trapped. They want you to feel trapped. They want to engage you,
persuade you, convince you, and all too often, threaten you. And
maybe you try to engage them, answering their shouts and jeers.
Many women do, clearing their throats and raising their voices,
justifying their choice or correcting the misinformation. But most
women simply stand there, confused, shaking, or distraught. With
papers and pamphlets flying in your face, shouting all around you,
and a feeling of the protestors circling, closing in on you like you
sit at the center of baited water, you may not know what to say,
how to say it, how to make yourself heard, or how to extricate
yourself from the situation. The clinic escort (if you have been
lucky enough to choose a clinic that has escorts) will take this
moment to touch your arm gently, and guide you away.
“There is no reasoning with them,” the escort will mutter
soothingly in your ear, if you look upset. “I’ve tried. Just
remember you don’t owe them anything. You know what is right
for you.” That short speech will carry you to the doors of the clinic;
hopefully you will not hear the crowd follow you to the doors,
screaming all the way.
Depending on where you live and what the laws of your state
are like, you may have the procedure done that day, or you may
have simply had a consultation. Like any medical procedure, the
information is a little overwhelming, although the kind doctor
tried to explain it to you. The information has filled your head and
you have completely forgotten the protestors, until you look out
the glass door as you exit and feel a sinking feeling in your
stomach. It is all you can do to open the door and step outside.
If you have had the procedure already, you are weakened and
tired, on a small dose of painkillers and in no position to deal with
the screaming. Rest is generally prescribed for women2 who have
just had an abortion, but you will find none outside the clinic doors.
Imagine that you are this woman, leaving after a minor surgical
procedure, alone, facing or having just faced an often-difficult

2 See FAQ: Post-Abortion Care and Recovery, University of California San Francisco,
http://www.ucsfhealth.org/education/post-abortion_care_and_recovery/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2015); see also Common Questions Women Have After an Abortion, FAMILY PLANNING
SPECIALISTS
MEDICAL
GROUP,
http://familyplanningspecialists.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Common-Questions-Women-Have-After-An-Abortion.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2015).
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decision fraught with personal turmoil or at least with social
stigma.
Now imagine that these people, who have harassed, belittled,
and frightened you once already, stop you again. This time you
push past. And then a frail old woman grabs your arm, pulls you
back, looks you in the eye and says, “you’re going to die.”3
It is hard to say where the threat begins and proselytizing,
“sidewalk counseling,” or protesting ends, or even whether
interactions like the above constitute a threat. In many states
women are not protected from this kind of verbal abuse. Scenes
like these are common to clinics during protests, and it certainly
feels like a threat to many women who are already facing difficult,
trying, or isolating circumstances.
Massachusetts had a law in place to protect clinic patients from
such situations, the Massachusetts Reproductive Healthcare
Facilities Act (MRHFA),4 which created a buffer zone around
abortion clinics. A buffer zone creates a space around a given
location, such as a clinic building, where protestors or people who
do not have legitimate business in the location cannot enter.
Buffer zones take many forms, but most commonly protect
entrances and driveways. The Massachusetts buffer zone was
reviewed in the 2014 decision McCullen v. Coakley,5 and the
Supreme Court struck down the MRHFA as a violation of the free
speech rights of the protestors who brought the suit.
One of the most basic tenets of our country is the entitlement to
free speech.6 The government may not make illegal or curtail most
forms of speech, even if it is distasteful or upsetting. Nevertheless,
to pursue genuine and compelling state interests, some
restrictions on free speech are allowed. The law restricting speech

3 It is hard to know what this utterance means, especially when frightened and alone.
Context clues may provide an answer: if her pamphlet warns of the risks of abortion, she
may be trying to over-emphasize the risks and scare you; religious signs may mean she
speaks metaphorically of your soul or of god’s wrath; if she is surrounded by younger,
stronger protestors she may even want to goad you into a fight. You may simply be unable
to tell, but you will almost certainly feel guilt, shame, fear, anxiety, or some combination of
all of these.
4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §120E1/2.
5 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
6 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.

AHEARN, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

4

11/8/2017 2:22 PM

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Vol. 30:1

must be content neutral7 and narrowly tailored.8 Traditionally,
buffer zones around various public spaces have been upheld as
constitutional speech restrictions.9
However, the Court in McCullen v. Coakley overturned the
MRHFA, ruling it was an unconstitutional restriction on free
speech. Although the context of abortion and clinic violence is
surprisingly under-discussed in the decision, given the changing
attitudes toward abortion and the increased passivity toward
protecting abortion as a right, the decision is not entirely
surprising. The Court has backed away from protecting abortion
rights and has enabled and allowed more restrictions as time
passed, and this decision is just another chip in the foundations of
the Court’s Roe v. Wade decision, and just another example of
increasing hostility toward abortion. What is surprising about the
case is its departure from free speech precedent, as the Court has
prioritized free speech over state concerns in a way that conflicts
with other free speech decisions. This Comment will assert that
the Court has likely caused a future increase in violence against
women and other people who utilize, work for, or support abortion
clinics, weakened the fundamental right to abortion, and
prioritized free speech over equally important rights and interests.
Part II will provide background on abortion and demonstrate the
change in attitudes toward and increasing restrictions of abortion.
Part III will discuss the history of buffer zones and McCullen and
will look at how McCullen departs from free speech precedent. It
will argue that the Court has incorrectly prioritized free speech as
a result of a hostility and bias toward abortion rights. This
Comment will conclude that the Court has wrongly decided
McCullen and will need to revisit the decision at a later date. It
will assert that the Supreme Court has wrongly prioritized free
7 Meaning that it cannot restrict certain kinds of speech. All speech must be restricted
equally. For a pertinent example, a state may not restrict anti-abortion speech around an
abortion clinic. However, it may restrict all speech around a clinic, if the law is narrowly
tailored and serves a legitimate state interest.
8 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that an ordinance
imposing a noise buffer on a concert was not a violation of free speech, since it was not an
overly broad restriction).
9 See generally Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 802 (holding that a noise buffer zone
around a charity concert was constitutional); Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d. 164
(1997) (holding that a buffer zone around an adult entertainment store was constitutional);
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1991) (upholding a buffer zone prohibiting soliciting votes
around a polling location).
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speech in an attempt to facilitate the chipping away of abortion
rights, and that the decision is not in line with precedent.
II.

Abortion Restrictions Increase, Standards of Scrutiny
in Restricting Abortion Become Less Strict

McCullen is a complicated case, and the decision addresses the
complex interplay that occurs when two rights seem to clash.
Here, these rights are the right to privacy (and by extension, an
abortion) and the right to freedom of speech. It is important to
understand the history of abortion law in the country and how it
has evolved to signal an era of hostility toward abortion rights and
a Court unwilling to vigorously protect such rights.
A. Background on Abortion
The history of abortion extends to the beginning of mankind,10
but the history of legal abortion in America is fairly recent. One
in three women in the United States will have an abortion by the
age of forty-five.11 Abortion was legal until 1821,12 when it was
banned in Connecticut after quickening, with other states
following shortly thereafter.13 Between 1821 and 1973, only four
states allowed abortion upon request, although some allowed
abortion in cases of rape or danger to the life of the mother.14 In
fact, until 1965, states could also legally prohibit men and women
from obtaining and using birth control.15
10 See Numbers 5:24, KING JAMES BIBLE (referencing abortion within the Bible); see
also JAMES M. RIDDLE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE
RENAISSANCE 27-28 (1994) (explaining that the Greek city-state of Cyrene drove a
subspecies of giant fennel, called silphium, extinct because its abortifacient properties were
so high in demand).
11 See
Planned
Parenthood,
Health
Info:
Abortion,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-info/abortion (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
12 N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS
CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 20 (2001).
13 Id. Quickening is the point at fetal development where the mother can feel the fetus
move.
14 See generally PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court (2013), available at http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-keyabortion-rulings-of-the-us-supreme-court/#regulations. These states were New York,
Hawaii, Alaska, and Washington.
15 See
Anthony
Comstock’s
“Chastity”
Laws, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_comstock.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2015); see also SANA LOUE ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, Comstock Laws 183-
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In 1965, the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut,16
and found there was a constitutional right of marital privacy17,
which was violated when married couples were prevented from
accessing birth control.18 This privacy right was extended to single
people in the 1972 decision Eisenstadt v. Baird,19 where the court
ruled that privacy rights are inherent in the individual,20
especially in something “so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”21 These two cases
set the foundation on which a landmark case would be decided only
one year after Baird. The case22 was Roe v. Wade23, and it
extended this individual right to private determinations about
childbearing to its logical conclusion. It overturned a complete ban
on abortion and made abortion legal throughout the country.24
The court ruled, as Griswold and Baird did before it, that the
right to privacy was encompassed in the penumbra of unspoken
rights granted by the language of the Constitution25, and that this
privacy right included the right to make sexual and reproductive
decisions.26 Though the right to abortion is based in a fundamental
privacy right, there is no right to privacy explicitly laid out in the
84 (2004). On March 3, 1873, Congress passed the Comstock Act. This law specifically
designated contraception as obscene material and made it a federal crime to disseminate
birth control through the mail or across state lines. Many states soon followed suit and
passed their own Comstock Laws, prohibiting the use, prescription, or dissemination of
birth control. Though key elements of the Comstock Law were repealed in 1971, some
vestiges remain, which have not been repealed despite several attempts. The latest attempt
to repeal the vestiges of the law was in 1997. See H.R. 2272, 105th Cong. (1997).
16 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17 Id. at 485.
18 See id. at 484. Though this constitutional right is not spelled out, the Court found
that the Bill of Rights contains certain rights by implication, called the penumbra of rights.
Griswold is based on the implied right to privacy created in the penumbra, which is
implicated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
19 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20 Id. at 453.
21 Id.
22 Although technically the Roe decision was a joint decision on two cases, Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton, it is often referred to as Roe for convenience. See, e.g., Lynne M. Kohm,
Roe’s Effects on Family Law, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2014) (referring to Roe v.
Wade as Roe).
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
24 See id. at 164. Though the law in question was a Texas law, the Supreme Court’s
decision to find the law unconstitutional meant that all states with laws banning abortion
became invalid.
25 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
26 Id.

AHEARN, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

ABORTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

11/8/2017 2:22 PM

7

Constitution.27 Nonetheless, the Court found such a right to exist.
It finds the roots of this right to privacy in the First Amendment,28
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,29 the penumbra of rights,30 the
Ninth Amendment,31 and in the Fourteenth Amendment concept
of liberty.32 Only personal rights that are deemed “‘fundamental’
or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’”33 can fall under this
guarantee of privacy, and this privacy right is broad enough to
encompass abortion.34
Roe determined that a state needed to have a compelling state
interest to restrict access to abortion.35 This is the most stringent
standard of review for any restrictions placed on a right, and is
called strict scrutiny review.36 In fact, Roe was decided with
“particularly careful scrutiny,”37 an even more heightened and
careful evaluation of abortion restrictions.38 It was understood
from the decision that abortion, as a fundamental right
encompassed in privacy rights, was to be reviewed under at least
strict scrutiny, and that the Court should take extra care with it.
Under this standard, most abortion restrictions would fail,
particularly those affecting the first trimester.39 Roe ruled that in
the first trimester, a patient and the consulting physician were
free to determine “without regulation by the state” that a
pregnancy should be terminated.40 The right to an abortion is

27 Id (acknowledging this, the Court goes on to explain how and where it exists in the
Constitution despite not being explicitly stated).
28 Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
29 Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
350-51 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)).
30 The penumbra of rights are rights which, although not explicitly stated in the
Constitution, follow logically from the rights that are explicitly granted. Therefore, these
implicit rights are in the penumbra, or shadow, of the Constitution. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
31 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
32 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
33 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 155.
36 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504.
37 Roe, 410 U.S. at 170.
38 Id. at 156.
39 Roe v. Wade ruled that an expecting person was to be less restricted in terminating
a fetus pre-viability, and that the state interest in protecting the unborn fetus became
greater as the fetus approached full term.
40 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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fundamental, the Court said, and may be effectuated “free of
interference by the State.”41
Women were not long without interference by the State, and
strict scrutiny did not remain the standard for long. In 1992,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey42
changed the standard applied by the courts to determine if state
abortion restrictions were too onerous.43 The Court changed the
standard to an “undue burden,”44 which was a new standard. The
Court ruled that this was an “appropriate means of reconciling the
State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected
liberty.”45 In Casey, Pennsylvania required a 24-hour waiting
period before an abortion, as well as spousal consent, parental
consent for minors, and other restrictions.46
All restrictions but the spousal consent passed the newly
lowered standard of review. Restrictions must now simply avoid
placing an “undue burden”47 on people who seek abortions. Rather
than requiring that the state have a compelling and legitimate
interest in the regulation,48 under this standard the plaintiff—the
person providing an abortion, seeking one, or otherwise
challenging restrictions—must prove that the state regulation
“has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”49 Not
only does this have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the
challenger of the statute, but it is also a less rigorous standard of
review, which has allowed more restrictions of abortion than
would have been allowed if the Roe standard of strict scrutiny had
continued.
This vague new standard posed problems for
legislatures and courts trying to interpret the circumstances
under which they may regulate abortion, and the decision also
signaled an unwillingness on the part of the Court to stringently
protect abortion rights, emboldening anti-choice legislators to
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id at 874.
Id.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 876.
505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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curtail the rights of people seeking abortions since the decision in
1992.
B. The Problems With Undue Burden
One of the many problems with the Casey decision is that the
articulated standard is vaguer than the previous standard. Strict
scrutiny is well defined, and it is also a relatively subjective
standard. The undue burden standard invites the judicial system
to speculate on what is, and what is not, a substantial burden on
women who often have very different socioeconomic backgrounds
and lifestyles than the judges and justices of the court. The
Supreme Court has not issued a bright line rule for what an undue
burden is, because there is no way to articulate a bright line rule.
But until the Court acknowledges that a small subset of women
bear a disproportionate amount of the burden in abortion
regulation, they will never properly apply an undue burden
analysis. And the way that undue burden is applied makes it
easier for the Court to take a lax stance on abortion protections.
C. Changing Standards, Changing Attitudes towards
Abortion
Casey signaled the beginning of a shift in how the Court
protected abortion rights, and in more legislative restrictions on
abortion rights. Since 1992, anti-abortion legislation has risen
steadily,50 with 950 bills proposed in 2010 alone.51 Of those 950,
89 passed, more than double what was passed in 2008.52 More
anti-abortion legislation was passed in 2011-2013 than the entire
decade previous.53 As of now, 89% of U.S. counties have no
abortion clinic,54 and for women in those counties who must travel
50 Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts
Providers—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, GUTTMACHER POLICY REVIEW,
(Winter
2014),
at
10,
available
at:
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/17/1/gpr170109.html#chart.
51 Id.
52 Guttmacher Inst., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2010 State Policy
Review,
GUTTMACHER
INST.,
(2010),
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2010/statetrends42010.html.
53 Boonstra & Nash, supra note 50.
54 State Facts About Abortion: Texas at 2, GUTTMACHER INST. (2014), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/pdf/texas.pdf.
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elsewhere to obtain their abortion, the distance can be almost
unmanageably far. Texas is frequently in the news for its extreme
anti-abortion measures, and as the second largest state in the
nation at 268,820 square miles, it has just 8 abortion clinics as of
2014.55 Even assuming that each clinic was spread equidistant
from the next,56 each clinic would need to serve an astonishing
33,602.5 square miles. For comparison, Massachusetts has 10,554
total square-miles and 12 abortion clinics as of 2013.57 If each
clinic were equidistant from the others,58 each clinic would serve
only 879.5 square-miles. For a resident of Massachusetts, a 24hour waiting period may not be considered burdensome, given the
relative proximity to a clinic.59 For a resident of Texas, however, a
24-hour waiting period likely means that 48 hours in total are
taken from work, school, or search for employment. It means
finding childcare, borrowing a car, finding money for bus fare or
gas, and significant amounts of travel during a phase of pregnancy
can be characterized as weariness and morning sickness for
many.60 In Massachusetts, a consultation, even a procedure, may
be close enough to achieve within a lunch break or a half-day. In
Texas, only a few lucky women have that convenience.
For a young woman who is undergoing her abortion procedure
due to rape, many restrictions can be cruel and even traumatic.

55 Texas
Abortion
Clinic
Map,
FUND
TEXAS
CHOICE,
http://fundtexaswomen.org/resources/texas-abortion-clinic-map/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
56 And this is not the case: the clinics are all located in or near a major city: Dallas (2),
Fort Worth (1), Austin (1), San Antonio (2), or Houston (2). See id.
57 Abortion Providers in Massachusetts, National Abortion Rights Action League
Massachusetts
(Jul.
2,
2013),
available
at,
http://www.prochoicemass.org/assets/bin/pdfs/providerchart.pdf.
58 See id. (In all fairness to Texas, this is not so in Massachusetts either. Many of the
clinics are grouped around Boston, Adams, or Springfield and Worcester).
59 This is not to say that it would not still be insulting to imply that people capable of
bearing children needed a state enforced time out before they could make up their minds
about a legal medical procedure. In fact, a waiting period may still violate fairness, equal
protection (the state does not insist that people seeking vasectomies wait any amount of
time before seeking the procedure, as an example), or other constitutional concerns.
60 ERROL R. NORWITZ ET AL., OXFORD AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF OBSETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY 56-7 (2007).
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Thirteen states61 require ultrasounds to be performed,62 and some
have laws encouraging women to have ultrasounds or to view
ultrasound images even though they are medically unnecessary.63
In three states, women are required to view the ultrasound.64 And
in Texas, women seeking abortions in the first trimester
(approximately 91% of all abortions)65 will likely need a
transvaginal ultrasound,66 since a less invasive abdominal
ultrasound will not capture an image of the fetus with the clarity
required by law.67 All of these laws may cause emotional, mental,
or physical distress to a recent sexual assault victim, and may
cause feelings of guilt, anger, depression, or a wide variety of other
61 See Ala. Code § 26-23A-4; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2156; Fla. Stat. Ann. §390.0111; Ind.
Code §16-34-2-1.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4a09; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §1299.35.2; Miss. Code
Ann. §41-41-135; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §90-21.82; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2317.56; Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 63 §1-738.2; Tex. Health and Safety Code Ann. §171.012; Va. Code Ann. §18.2-76;
Wis. Stat. Ann. §253.10. All of these laws were passed in the last five years, most in the
last three.
62 Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
All of these states should probably refresh their
understanding of Casey’s undue burden holding, which specifically states that “[a]s with
any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a
woman seeking an abortion, but may not impose unnecessary health regulations that
present a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.” Also, The American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have spoken out against forced ultrasound laws as
unnecessary and harmful to the physician-patient relationship. See generally: The
Executive Bd. of the Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the Am. Cong. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists; Statement of Policy: Legislative Interference with Patient
Care, Medical Decisions, and the Patient-Physician Relationship (May 2013), available at
http://www.acog.org/-/media/Statements-ofPolicy/Public/2013LegislativeInterference.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20150308T2208565881. Though
they have not been so ruled yet, and may never be given the Court’s recent attitude toward
restricting abortion, unnecessary, forced ultrasounds certainly seem like exactly the sort of
medical procedure Casey specifically ruled impermissible.
63 Guttmacher
Institute,
Requirements
for
Ultrasound,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (last visited
Nov. 17, 2016). Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin all require women to be provided with
information encouraging them to seek access to ultrasounds.
64 See id. These states are Kansas, Texas, and Wisconsin.
65 KAREN PAZOL ET AL., ABORTION SURVEILLENCE—UNITED STATES, CNT. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, 2009, available
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6108.pdf; see Jodi Jacobson, Late Abortions: Facts,
Stories, and Ways to Get Help, RH REALITY CHECK (Jun. 2, 2009), available at
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2009/06/02/lateterm-abortions-facts-stories-and-wayshelp/.
66 See
Transvaginal
Ultrasound,
MEDLINEPLUS,
available
at
https://medlineplus.gov/article003779.htm. A transvaginal ultrasound is one where the
ultrasonic device is inserted into the vagina for a clear picture of the reproductive organs
and fetus.
67 DAVOR JURKOVIC ET AL., GYNAECOLOGICAL ULTRASOUND IN CLINICAL PRACTICE:
ULTRASOUND IMAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF GYNAECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 143 (2009).
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reactions in any woman.68 Proponents of these ultrasound laws
often say that the instances of abortion caused by rape and incest
are low.69 They are right, with most statistics finding 1% to 2.5%
of abortions are because of rape and incest.70 Even if one were to
argue that ultrasounds are no more than a slight inconvenience to
women who are not the victims of rape or incest,71 Casey reasoned
that,
[t]he analysis [of whether an abortion restriction constitutes
an undue burden] does not end with the one percent of
women72 upon whom the statute operates; it begins there.
Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution
by its impact on those whose conduct it affects. . . . The proper
focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law
is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.73
By this logic, it does not matter whether the ultrasound laws are
harmful to 1% or 100% of women, if they are a burden on any, they
must be evaluated for the effect they have on that group. Still,
ultrasound laws persist. No challenge to the law has yet made it
to the Supreme Court, but the number of such abortion restrictions
continues to increase.

68 For a description of one woman’s distress, see Bonnie Rochman, Requiring
Ultrasounds Before Abortion: One Mother’s Personal Tragedy, TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 23,
2012), available at http://healthland.time.com/2012/03/23/requring-ultrasounds-beforeabortion-one-mothers-personal-tragedy/. Consider also other circumstances that may lead
to distress upon being forced to view an ultrasound or hear it described, including
circumstances not exempted by law. For example, women who want children but are in
situations of domestic violence; women who cannot afford to go through a pregnancy
without healthcare (or with healthcare that is not comprehensive enough to provide for
them); or women who have mental or physical conditions that will make birth painful, or
who cannot be pregnant if they wish to take daily medications.
69 Laurence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and
Qualitative Perspectives, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 3, 2005) at 113, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005.pdf; see generally MM Holmes et al.,
Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Characteristics from a National
Sample of Women, AM. JOURNAL OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY (Aug. 1996), available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8765248.
70 See FINER, supra note 69.
71 And there are any number of reasons why state sanctioned guilt and coercion may
have a negative effect on women from all walks of life, sexual assault victims or not.
72 This was in reference to the challenge to the spousal consent portion of the law in
Casey. Challengers to the law said it would impose an undue burden on women in domestic
abuse situations, while proponents of the law said this was not an undue burden since only
approximately 1% of women seeking abortions were in situations of domestic abuse.
73 Casey, 505 U.S. at 896.
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Another example of the increasing hostility toward abortion is
clinic violence. Only twelve years ago, the Court denied certiorari
to Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American
Coalition of Life Activists,74 which involved anti-abortion
protestors and activists who threatened abortion providers by
printing “wanted” posters with their faces and personal
information, and distributing them around the providers work and
home areas. The posters included a “reward” and encouraged
violence against the pro-choice doctors, nurses, and staff.75 Stories
of clinic violence are not uncommon,76 and the Supreme Court
must have been aware of this when deciding McCullen. Nationally,
almost one in four clinics reports being the victim of “severe”
violence, most commonly “bomb threats, death threats, stalking,
and blockades[.]”77 Clinic violence peaked in the late 1990’s,78 and
as buffer zone laws began to pass in states and municipalities in
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s,79 clinic violence declined.80

74 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (cert. denied) (By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court allowed
a judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood against aggressive and violent harassers to
remain uncontested).
75 290 F.3d. 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2002).
76 See generally David Barstow, An Abortion Battle, Fought to the Death, N.Y. TIMES
(Jul.
25,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/us/26tiller.html?pagewanted=all; Anti-Choice Violence
and Intimidation, NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE (Jan. 1, 2015), available at
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-anti-choice-violence.pdf; Ilyse
Hogue, Why the History of Anti-Abortion Violence Cannot Be Ignored, MSNBC (Aug. 9,
2014), available at http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/women-choice-abortion-violence; 5 Years
After Dr. George Tiller’s Murder, a Doctor Braves Threats to Continue Abortions in Witchita,
DEMOCRACY NOW!, http://www.democracynow.org/2014/6/4/5_years_after_dr_george_tiller
(last visited Mar. 4, 2015); William Booth, Doctor Killed During Abortion Protest,
WASHINGTON
POST
(SPECIAL
REPORT)
(Mar.
3,
1993),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/abortviolence/stories/gunn.htm;
and for stories specific to Massachusetts see generally Molly Redden, 12 Horror Stories
Show Why Wednesday’s Big Supreme Court Abortion Case Matters, MOTHERJONES (Jan.
14, 2014), available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/01/abortion-horrorstories-supreme-court-massachusetts-mccullen-coakley (discussing 12 stories of clinic
violence, all of which occurred in Massachusetts).
77 Art Winslow, A Suspenseful Tale About Identity, Reality and Evil, CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Mar.
13,
2005),
available
at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-0313/entertainment/0503110451_1_nuremberg-files-cloning-reproductive.
78 Violence
Statistics,
NATIONAL
ABORTION
FEDERATION
(2012),
http://prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/violence/violence-statistics-and-history/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2015).
79 See COL. STAT. REV. ANN. §18-9-122; MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. CH. 266 §120E; MONT.
CODE ANN. §45-8-110; N.H. REV. STAT §132:38.
80 Violence Statistics, supra note 78.
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The holding in McCullen that the Massachusetts buffer zone
was unconstitutional fits into a larger pattern of increased
tolerance for abortion restrictions. The past two decades have seen
an increase in abortion restrictions aimed at chipping away at the
foundations of Roe v. Wade. Between 2001 and 2010, states
enacted 189 abortion restrictions all together, but between 2011
and 2013 there have been 205 restrictions passed nationwide.81 In
2000, Guttmacher Institute classified 13 states as hostile to
abortion, for having at least four major restrictions on the
procedure.82 Now, the number has swelled to 27,83 and women in
more than half of the states in the United States live in a place
where they will “likely struggle to terminate a pregnancy.”84 In not
just the United States, but worldwide, more restrictions on
abortion lead to more maternal deaths, birth-related
complications, and infant deaths.85 This increase in anti-abortion
legislation is likely due to emboldened legislators, who notice the
Court’s less protective stance toward abortion rights. This
increased passivity when deciding abortion cases also helps to
explain how the Court decided McCullen; because the court values
free speech above the right to privacy86 and abortion, it is more
willing to sacrifice the right to an abortion even when there is no
cognizable violation of free speech. Here, it resulted not only in a

81 Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 State
Policy
Review,
GUTTMACHER
INST.
(2014),
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html.
82 See id. Most of the restrictions which flagged a state as hostile to abortion were laterterm abortion bans, restrictions on abortion providers, limitations on the provision of
medication abortion and restrictions on coverage of abortion in private health plans.
83 Id.
84 Tara Culp-Ressler, In the Past Three Years, We’ve Enacted More Abortion
Restrictions than During the Entire Previous Decade, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 2, 2014),
available at http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/01/02/3112081/abortion-restrictions2011-2013/ (discussing: Ian Milhiser & Tara Culp-Ressler, The Greatest Trick the Supreme
Court Ever Pulled Was Convincing the World Roe v. Wade Still Exists, THINKPROGRESS
(Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/12/04/2919111/supremecourt-roe-wade-exists/).
85 Lisa B. Haddad & Nawal M. Nour, Unsafe Abortion: Unnecessary Maternal
Mortality, REVIEWS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY (vol. 2 Spring 2009), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2709326/; Stephanie Castillo, States With
More Abortion Restrictions Hurt Women’s Health, Increase Risk for Maternal Death, MED.
DAILY (Oct. 3, 2014), available at http://www.medicaldaily.com/states-more-abortionrestrictions-hurt-womens-health-increase-risk-maternal-death-306181.
86 The court does this even though both free speech and privacy are considered
fundamental rights.
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continuation of dangerous conditions for women, but a departure
from free speech precedent by the Court.
III.

McCullen Fits into a Larger Pattern of Increasing
Abortion Restriction, But Not into Free Speech
Precedent

McCullen is a departure from precedent in both other buffer
zone cases and other free speech cases. McCullen represents
another hostile precedent toward abortion, which could have
major repercussions for abortion as a protected fundamental right.
A. History of Buffer Zones
The Supreme Court has analyzed the constitutionality of
abortion clinic buffer zones on several occasions, and has generally
protected such laws. Buffer zones create areas of restricted access
to specified locations. They restrict some or all people from
entering a certain area, require that people must leave a certain
area after a certain time, or otherwise serve to filter who is in what
place and when. A fixed buffer zone does not move and sets an
outer limit around a location, which specified people cannot
enter.87 A floating buffer zone surrounds a moving point of
interest, which specified people may not approach.88 Buffer zones
surround areas in everyday public life, from voting booths to
schools.89 Many go largely uncontested, and when they are, they
are usually upheld and generally considered to be narrowly
tailored, even when they are very wide. For example, in Phillips v.
Borough of Keyport,90 a 300-600 foot buffer zone around an adult
entertainment store was upheld as constitutional. In fact, this
rather large buffer zone was upheld in spite of the Court’s
87 E.g.: Protestors must remain 25 feet from entranceways and driveways to
reproductive healthcare facilities.
88 E.g.: Protestors may not approach within 6 feet of anyone entering or exiting a
reproductive healthcare facility.
89 For a contemporary and interesting example, see Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207
(2011) (examining the adherence of a group of protesters affiliated with the Westboro
Baptist Church to a buffer zone of 1,000 feet, which prevented protests around funeral
homes and cemeteries); see also Mark Sherman, Westboro Baptist Church Wins Supreme
Court Appeal Over Funeral Protests, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/02/westboro-baptist-church-w_n_830209.html.
90 107 F.3d 164, 172 (1997).
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acknowledgement that the speech restriction was not content
neutral,91 and that the lack of content neutrality put even more of
a burden on the state to tailor the restriction to impose the least
possible burden.92 The wide buffer zone was deemed necessary to
public interest and welfare, providing a compelling enough state
interest that it was seen as reasonably the “least possible”
burden.93
Buffer zones that span hundreds of feet are found in other areas
of public life as well. For example, in Massachusetts, the buffer
zone around polling locations is 150 feet.94 In Louisiana, it is 600
feet.95 The buffer zones around polling places are generally
justified to avoid the distribution of material “intended to
influence”96 the voters on their way into the ballot box. Only one
case about polling location buffer zones has gone to the Supreme
Court,97 and only a handful of challenges have been brought to
court at all.98 In 1992, the Supreme Court heard Burson v.
Freeman,99 where a Tennessee political party worker sought to
enjoin statutes prohibiting the distribution of campaign materials
and solicitation of votes within 100 feet of the polling place.100 The
Court applied strict scrutiny, and determined the buffer zone was
valid because it served a compelling state interest to protect a
voter’s right to cast a vote “in an environment which is free from
intimidation, harassment, confusion, obstruction, and undue
influence.”101
91 Id. at 172. The town was specifically targeting the adult entertainment store because
of the products they sold, but argued a compelling state interest in protecting children and
public welfare with a 300-foot buffer because it “afforded a constitutionally sufficient
opportunity for adult expression.”
92 Id. at 173.
93 Id. at 172.
94 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 54 § 65; See Linda Killan, Supreme Court Hypocrisy on Buffer
Zones?, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 27, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/06/27/supremehypocrisy-on-buffer-zones/ (accusing the Court of hypocrisy for stripping a 35 foot buffer
zone from Massachusetts clinics when the Court is protected by a wide buffer zone across
the Supreme Court plaza).
95 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 18:1462.
96 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 54 § 65.
97 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
98 See Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 769 F.3d. 919 (2014); Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d.
651 (2004); PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 902 F. Supp. 2d. 724 (2012).
99 504 U.S.191 (1992).
100 Id. at 193-94.
101 Id. at 194-95.
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It is such harassment, undue influence, and intimidation that
buffer zones around abortion clinics are meant to prevent, in
addition to clinic violence. The Court had a long history of
upholding buffer zones around abortion clinics, especially fixed
buffer zones. For example, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,
Inc.,102 the Supreme Court specifically ruled that a 36 foot buffer
zone around clinic driveways and entrances was constitutional.103
This fixed buffer zone was found to burden “no more speech than
necessary to accomplish the governmental interests in protecting
access to the clinic and facilitating an orderly traffic flow on
the street.”104 Following Madsen the Court decided Schenck v. ProChoice Network of Western New York,105 which also involved a
court issued injunction rather than a statute.106 In the opinion, the
Supreme Court stressed the importance of deference to the district
court’s finding of a “proper distance to ensure access.”107 The Court
reasoned that the district court is in a better position to determine
what kind of buffer zone will properly protect the interests of all
parties involved.108 The Court in Schenck upheld a 15 foot fixed
buffer zone around the clinic, while striking down the floating
buffer zones109 of 15 feet around any person entering or exiting the
clinic.110 These floating buffer zones were said to burden speech
more than necessary by enacting a broad prohibition against
leafleting and other forms of public area speech, and were
considered too vague for proper enforcement.111 The Court in
Schenck also cited safety concerns as justifying the buffer zone,

102 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
103 Id. at 770 (protestors blocked access to a Florida clinic, so a court enjoined them

from interfering with public access to the clinic. The injunction was broadened to a 36-foot
buffer zone around the entrances and driveways of the clinic, as well as other provisions.
However, the Supreme Court did reject some aspects of this injunction, such as the
prohibition of signs and buffer zones for clinic doctors’ private homes).
104 Id.
105 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
106 Id. at 366-67. Protestors routinely blockaded this abortion clinic, so an injunction
was issued with a 15-foot fixed buffer zone, as well as a 15-foot floating buffer zone.
107 Id. at 381.
108 Id. Protecting such interests means balancing the protestors’ First Amendment
rights with the government interest of ensuring public safety and order.
109 See id. at 377-78 (describing floating buffer zones as the protestor’s boundaries
shifting as the object the boundaries protect moves).
110 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 379.
111 Id. at 377.
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holding that preventing threats of violence112 was a sufficient
governmental interest. The Court also ruled that keeping
protestors out of close proximity to cars and patients was not too
broad an interest or aim. 113
A few years later the court decided a similar case, Hill v.
Colorado.114 The law being challenged in Hill created a fixed zone
of 100 feet, inside of which existed a floating buffer zone of 8
feet.115 Protestors could not enter this floating buffer zone without
the consent of the patient or staff member entering or exiting the
clinic.116 In Hill, the Court expressly acknowledged a state
interest in protecting “those who enter a health care facility from”
unwilling listeners from speech or conduct that really represented
“harassment, the nuisance, the persistent importuning, the
following, the dogging, and the implied threat of physical touching
that can accompany an unwelcome approach[.]”117 In short, the
Court acknowledged the need to protect people from harassment
being disguised as freedom of speech, and allowed states to
distinguish between the two. Hill also urged deference to the
legislature’s judgment about the best way to balance all the
competing interests of the protestors’ right to free speech with the
clinic patients and workers’ right to privacy and safety.118 Again,
the Court believed that the body creating the buffer zone had the
best information and insight to determine what will work best for
the clinics involved. In all three of these cases, the Court protected
the states’ right to shield clinic patients and staff from harassment
and violence, deferred to decisions about how to implement buffer
zones, and upheld buffer zones in varying sizes.
B. Background on McCullen
In deciding McCullen, the Court declined to follow this buffer
zone precedent. In McCullen, a private citizen sued the
Massachusetts Attorney General to challenge the Massachusetts
112 Id. at 375-76 (mentioning that the threats of violence did at times escalate into
actual fighting).
113 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376.
114 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 703 (2000).
115 Id.
116 Hill, 503 U.S. at 703.
117 Id. at 724.
118 Id. at 704.
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Reproductive Healthcare Facilities Act (MRHFA). The MRHFA
was originally passed in 2000. In 2007 it was amended to include
a 35-foot wide buffer zone around the entrances and driveways to
all reproductive healthcare facilities.119 This was done in
response120 to a wave of anti-choice violence121 around the country
which had led to11 murders, 17 attempted murders, 550 incidents
of stalking, plus harassment and other violations of individual
privacy of pro-choice doctors, patients, staff, and advocates.122 In
Massachusetts alone, there had been two murders, as well as five
people injured during an attempted murder.123 The original
version of the law contained a 15 foot buffer zone with a 6 foot “no
approach” zone,124 meaning that once inside the 15 foot buffer
zone, no protestor could approach within 6 feet of a patient or
provider without permission.125 The revised version expanded the
buffer zone to disallow protestors entirely, while removing the no
approach zone.126
Eleanor McCullen and the other plaintiffs127 were protestors,
who styled themselves as “sidewalk counselors” and engaged in
regular attempts to speak to, help, and “counsel” young women
using the Massachusetts clinics these protestors frequented.128
The crux of their claim was that because they sought to engage in
119 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §120E1/2.
120 See generally: Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 1-12, McCullen v. Coakley, 134

S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168); S. JOURNAL, 185th Cong., at 3 (Mass. Nov. 8, 2007).
121 Nationwide, “1 in 5 clinics report experiencing severe violence.” See Susie Gillian et
al., 2014 National Clinic Violence Survey, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION (2014),
available at http://www. http://feminist.org/rrights/pdf/2014ncapsurvey.pdf
122 Violence and Disruption Statistics, NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION (2014),
https://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/Stats_Table_2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
These figures represent the most recent compiled statistics but do not take into account
clinic violence that occurred in abortion clinics in 2015. In late November of 2015, three
people were murdered in a Planned Parenthood in Colorado Springs, the first murders
directly linked to anti-abortion violence since 2009. See Julie Turkewitz and Jack Healy, 3
Are Dead in Colorado Springs Shootout at Planned Parenthood Center, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
27, 2015).
123 Christopher B. Daly, Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 in Attack on Abortion Clinics,
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 31, 1994), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/longterm/abortviolence/stories/salvi.htm
124 Though differently phrased, the “no approach” zone was essentially a floating buffer
zone.
125 MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §2 (2000) (repealed).
126 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §120E1/2.
127 The other plaintiffs were Jean Blackburn Zarella, Gregory A. Smith, Eric Cadin,
and Carmel Ferrell. McCullen v. Coakley, 759 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D. Mass. 2010).
128 Id. at 208.
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conversation with the clinic patients, rather than protest, the
buffer zone was a violation of their free speech rights.129 The court
declared that the law, as amended, was a violation of Eleanor
McCullen’s (and other protestors) constitutional rights, as it was
not narrowly tailored to be a reasonable restriction on free
speech.130 The Court reasoned that for a law to be narrowly
tailored, “the government must demonstrate that alternative
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to
achieve the government’s interests[.]”131
The protestors who brought the suit acknowledged that
approximately 5% of passersby stopped to engage them, that they
were not restricted from standing in other areas on the public
sidewalk which left them visible to the clinic patients and workers,
and that they were both seen and heard from the clinic while
outside the buffer zone.132 There was no claim that they need to
enter the buffer zone in order to be adequately heard, but rather
that their rights were violated despite their visibility.
C. Understanding Buffer Zones as a Restriction on Free
Speech and McCullen as Inconsistent with Buffer Zone
and Free Speech Precedent
To understand why McCullen should have conformed to preexisting precedent, it is important to understand free speech and
analyze the case against free speech precedent while comparing it
to other buffer zone cases.
The First Amendment provides that the government shall make
no law “abridging the freedom of speech,”133 meaning that people
in the United States have wide latitude to express their opinions
without fear of governmental reprisal. It has been extended over
time to include not just speech, but expression generally.134
129
130
131
132
133
134

See generally id.
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2521.
Id. at 2524.
McCullen, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
This means essays, dance, silence, music, protest signs, and other forms of
expression are as protected as traditional speech is. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 790
(holding that music, although speech, was subject to restriction); Clark v. Community for
Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that protests were subject to
restriction even though they were a protected form of speech).
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Freedom of speech is one of the most important rights granted to
United States citizens, as evidenced by its inclusion in the very
First Amendment in the Bill of Rights.135
Contrary to what many laypeople believe, freedom of speech is
not an unrestricted right in the United States. Although perhaps
one of our most lauded and protected fundamental rights, there is
a history almost as old as the country itself of restricting speech
that is violent or which in some ways runs afoul of public policy
considerations. Perhaps the oldest case to recognize that the Bill
of Rights is not without restrictions is Robertson v. Baldwin.136
The 1897 case involved a man arrested for refusing to complete a
seaman’s contract.137 Although the Court held that the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery and servitude, was not
meant to invalidate laws against desertion, it provided that the
Bill of Rights, generally, was simply meant to embody certain
guarantees and immunities “which had, from time immemorial,
been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions[.]”138 The Court
simply found that anti-desertion laws were not such an exception.
Later, two 1919 cases relied on that language when looking
specifically at restrictions on free speech, citing the case when
discussing exceptions to First Amendment freedoms. Frohwerk v.
United States139 ruled that the First Amendment as written
“cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give
immunity for every possible use of language.”140 Seven days
previously, Schenck v. United States141 had stated that when
135 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
136 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
137 Id. Robertson contracted to be a seaman aboard a ship bound for Valparaiso, Chile.

He became dissatisfied with his employment and disembarked while the ship was in
Astoria, Oregon, and refused to continue the voyage. He was then arrested and held before
being returned to the ship against his will. When he continued to refuse to complete his
work, he was charged. The man argued that the statute allowing him to be charged with
desertion constituted a violation of his Thirteenth Amendment rights. The Thirteenth
Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude.
138 Id. at 281.
139 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). In this case, Jason Frohwerk was charged with conspiracy
to violate the Espionage Act. He was charged with preparing to circulate a paper
encouraging people to disloyalty and mutiny among military and naval forces. Frohwerk
contended that the law prohibiting such circulation was a violation of his right to free
speech.
140 Id.
141 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49, 52 (1919). This case is also one where
the defendants were originally charged with violations of the Espionage Act. They were also
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determining when states could restrict a person’s free speech, the
Court considers “whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.”142 This was the first articulation of a rule that the
Supreme Court would refine over the course of the 20th century to
determine if a restriction on free speech was constitutional.
This rule for free speech restrictions is best summarized in Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, which reasoned that,
even in a public forum the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the
information.”143
In 1989, Ward v. Rock Against Racism evaluated a noise buffer,
which required a concert to keep its volume within certain limits
so that the general community would not hear it.144 In the
decision, the Court held that when free speech was being regulated
according to time, place, or manner, the restriction “need not be
the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of regulating that
speech, although it could not be substantially burdensome.145 This
important decision ruled that if a law is content neutral and based
on a compelling state interest, and the restriction is not
“substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s
interest,”146 it cannot be defeated simply because a less restrictive
option is available.
said to have circulated printed material, which caused and intended to cause mutiny in
military and naval forces.
142 Id.
143 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.,781, 791 (quoting Clark v. Comm. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). For other cases with regulation test
language, see Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
144 Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 781.
145 Id. at 798.
146 Id. at 799.
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The Court agreed that the law being contested in McCullen was
content neutral, as it does not “draw content-based distinctions on
its face.”147 The Court ruled that “a facially neutral law does not
become content based simply because it may disproportionately
effect speech on certain topics,”148 and that incidental effect is not
enough if the regulation serves a purpose unrelated to the content
of the expression involved.149 Though the law is concededly
content neutral, the Court holds that the law is not narrowly
tailored enough.150 However, this runs contrary to the Court’s
previous precedent on what narrow tailoring means.
An
examination of the meaning of narrow tailoring and a comparison
to other buffer zone cases highlights the inconsistency of this
decision to other Supreme Court precedent.
In order for a speech restriction to be narrowly tailored, it must
not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further
the government’s legitimate interests.”151 Although it need not be
the least restrictive of all possible options, the regulation must not
“regulate speech in such a manner that a substantial portion of
the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.”152
The regulation in McCullen seems to have been developed with
Madsen153 in mind, using similar distances to measure the buffer
zone and measuring the zones specifically around the entrances
and driveways. It also avoided the problematic aspects of the
regulation in Madsen, such as sign restrictions and buffer zones
for surrounding property. The choice of a 35-foot buffer zone
around driveways and entrances was not very likely an accident,
and was probably the result of an effort to conform to the Supreme
Court precedent in Madsen and other cases. The District Court in
McCullen found that the 35-foot buffer zone was adequate to
ensure the patients and prospective patients had access to the
147
148
149
150
151
152

McCullen 134 S. Ct., at 2531.
Id.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
McCullen, 134 S. Ct at 2523.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
Id. at 798-99 (“Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as
the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.’” (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985))).
153 512 U.S. 753 (1994). Madsen ruled that a similarly sized fixed buffer zone (of 36feet) was constitutional.
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clinic, while leaving open “adequate alternative means of
communication” for the protestors.154 Although the first iteration
of the Massachusetts Reproductive Healthcare Facilities Act may
have been constitutional under Hill, floating buffer zones are a
delicate and more controversial subject. Their replacement in
2007 with the 35-foot fixed buffer zone should have made the
MRHFA less controversial as fixed buffer zones are more often
upheld. It also allows protestors greater freedom of expression
than the original Act. For many years, courts have determined
that buffer zones similar to the one in the MRHFA are narrowly
tailored to achieve a long-conceded governmental interest in
protecting patient privacy and clinic safety,155 and the decision in
McCullen flies in the face of years of precedent about what narrow
tailoring of abortion specific speech should look like. It also
disregards a precedent of deference to the Legislature and to the
District Courts when deciding what is an appropriate amount of
space to balance the interests of the protestors, patients, and
government.
In addition to narrow tailoring, another important consideration
of free speech restriction is whether the restriction “leave[s] open
ample alternative channels of communication.”156 If speech is
restricted but a person has other channels and means to
disseminate expression, the restriction is considered more
narrowly tailored and less burdensome.157 The restriction
challenged in McCullen leaves more than ample channels for the
protestors to communicate their feelings about abortion. From 35feet away, signs would be clearly visible. Any patients158 walking
to the clinic could be approached from more than 35-feet away, and
any patients driving by would see signs clearly. There were no
noise restrictions in the statute, and handing out leaflets outside
the buffer zone perimeter was permitted. As the District Court
noted in its opinion, “it is apparent that Plaintiffs are able to
154 McCullen, 844 F. Supp. 2d 206, 224 (2012).
155 As evidenced by Madsen, Schenck, and Hill. The rulings in these cases all discussed

this important interest and found buffer zones to be narrowly tailored, even ones larger
than the one challenged in McCullen. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753; Schenck v. Pro Choice
Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 357 (1997); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 703 (2000).
156 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
157 Ward, 491 U.S. 802; Clark, 468 U.S. 293.
158 Or any passerby at all, in fact.
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convey their pro-life message to people entering the clinic and
people passing by.”159 The court further noted that any patients
interested in the message being broadcast by the plaintiffs were
free and able to approach them, and that at one location
approximately 5% of the patients and passersby did engage with
the plaintiff.160 Being restricted from standing directly next to the
clinic’s two driveways “does not mean that adequate alternative
means of communication do not exist,” and as the District Court
noted, “Plaintiffs may engage in any form of communicative
activity they desire anywhere else on the public sidewalk.”161 The
narrow tailoring of the MRHFA is even more clearly demonstrated
by the ease with which the plaintiffs were able to continue
spreading their message, being visible and audible at all times.
D. McCullen as an Endorsement of Harassment as a Valid
Exercise of Speech
The Supreme Court is not balancing the interests of the
government and protestors; it is sacrificing the safety, health, and
privacy of people seeking abortions to an overextension of freedom
of speech. One of the most important elements of a free and
democratic government is that it protects the fundamental rights
of its people from those who wish to infringe upon them. Though
the protestors and “sidewalk counselors” at abortion clinics claim
to only want to provide information to the willing listener,
evidence (anecdotes162 as well as statistics on violence and

159
160
161
162

McCullen, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
For such anecdotes, see REDDEN, supra note 76, (this article was written in response
to McCullen v. Coakley, to highlight violence clinics often face). See also Aaron Gouveia, My
Wife’s Abortion v. Your Free Speech, TIME MAGAZINE (Jun. 26, 2014), available at
http://time.com/2928275/supreme-court-abortion-free-speech/ (a piece written in response
to McCullen, by a man whose YouTube video of himself confronting protestors harassing
his wife went viral.); Abortion Doctor: AL Protestors “More Harassing”, WSFA12 NEWS (May
22, 2014), available at http://www.wsfa.com/story/25590440/abortion-doctor-al-protestersmore-harassing (a news piece profiling a doctor’s perspective on clinic harassment);
Samantha Lachman, Undercover Audio Reveals How Anti-Abortion Activists Pursue
Patients,
Providers,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
12,
2014),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/12/abortion-protesters-_n_5672077.html
(an
article about an anti-abortion protest “training video” in which protestors were encouraged
to track patient license plates, “line” sidewalks to maximize intimidation, and look up
district records to follow abortion providers throughout the state).
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harassment)163 proves otherwise. To quote an article on the
McCullen decision: “if there’s only one participant, is it even a
conversation?”164 The goal of these sidewalk counselors is not to
merely converse, not to merely express themselves. It is to shame
and harass women who have made a choice the protestors disagree
with. If the goal were open-ended, civil conversation with
consenting individuals, the protestors would have no need to avail
themselves of the limited buffer zone area, since from 35-feet away
they can still be seen and heard. If consensual conversation were
their goal, willing participants would come to them, as one
plaintiff in McCullen admitted happened about 5% of the time.165
The protestors were free to make themselves known and available
to patients,166 though without the ability to approach them.
Protestors also had to remain a respectful distance if the patients
were not interested in their dialogue.167
The Supreme Court has sanctioned harassment in free speech
clothing, and by all accounts the state of Massachusetts introduced
evidence enough to make the Court aware of this. The opinion
failed to acknowledge that opposition to abortion has led to 8
murders, 17 attempted murders, 550 incidents of stalking, plus
harassment and other violations of individual privacy of pro-choice
doctors, patients, staff, and advocates.168 Indeed, the Court makes
163 See generally: Violence Statistics supra note 77; GILLIAN, supra note 121.
164 Emily Jane Goodman, Supreme Court Decision on Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones

Opens the Door to Further Challenges, THE NATION (Jul. 1, 2014), available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/180474/supreme-court-decision-abortion-clinic-bufferzones-opens-door-further-challenges.
165 McCullen, 844 F.2d at 223.
166 At no time in McCullen did any of the plaintiffs contest the fact that they could be
easily seen, heard, and noticed from outside the buffer zone at any of the clinics they
frequented.
167 Indeed, for a group styling themselves as counselors, they certainly are not following
traditional counseling methods. It is a rare occasion indeed that a psychologist takes to the
streets, demanding to diagnose passersby. If they truly were interested in counseling
women who wanted more information about abortion alternatives, they should be more
content to make themselves known and allow such women to come speak to them.
168 The Court failed to acknowledge this even though it was the focus of the
respondent’s argument in favor of the law. See generally Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 12, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168),
2013 WL 6157111, *12; Brief of Amici Curiae, Am. Coll. of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Am.
Med. Ass’n, and Mass. Med. Soc’y for Respondents at 11-2, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct.
2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 6213247, *12-13; Brief of Amici Curiae, Civil Rights
Orgs. For Respondents at *26, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 11-1268),
2013 WL 6228466, *1; Brief of Amici Curiae, Law Professors in Support of Respondent at 1,
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 U.S. 2518 (2014)(No. 11-1268), 2013 WL 6235567, *1; Brief of
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only two mentions of the violence faced by abortion clinics,169
despite its paramount importance to the case. The Court also
made little to no mention of the evidence that buffer zones do
decrease violence in, and increase access to, reproductive
healthcare clinics, keeping protestors at a safe distance to stop the
escalation of already tense interactions.170
Clinics in Massachusetts fear the decision has already
pressured people to stay home. In the week following the decision,
a Planned Parenthood in the state reported more no-shows than
usual.171 Protestors were observed following patients down the
street and to the doors of the clinic, even as most patients showed
a desire to be left alone by ignoring them. One young woman
entering the clinic said she “felt uncomfortable,” and described the
protestors’ behavior as making her “feel harassed[.]”172 Coakley,
the Massachusetts Attorney General who unsuccessfully defended
the buffer zone regulation, stated that since the buffer zone was
struck down, many women “have had their access denied as a
practical matter”173 because they have been afraid to access the
clinic.
Given the rise of anti-abortion violence that occurred during the
1990’s, a law like the MRHFA provided vital protection to
individuals who wished to avail themselves of abortion services.174

Amici Curiae, Nat’l Abortion Fed’n & 31 Other Orgs. at 5-21, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 U.S.
2518 (11-1268), 2013 WL 6504289, *1; see also Violence Statistics supra note 78.
169 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 U.S. 2518, 2523, 2532 (2014).
170 Most acts of violence against clinics happen within feet of clinic doors, and many
are the result of the escalation of protestors. Many protestors were known for protesting
and harassing clinics in their area well before they committed acts of violence. See generally
Brief of Nat’l Abortion Fed’n & 31 Other Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 6504289, *18.
171 Laura Bassett, Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones Crumble Around the Country,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jul.
9,
2014),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/09/abortion-clinic-buffer-zo_n_5571516.html;
Alana Semuels, Abortion Buffer Zone Laws Begin Falling Apart After Supreme Court
Ruling,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jul.
7,
2014),
available
at
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-buffer-zone-laws-struck-down20140707-story.html.
172 Alana Semuels, Abortion Buffer Zone Laws Begin Falling Apart After Supreme
Court
Ruling,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jul.
7,
2014),
available
at
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-buffer-zone-laws-struck-down20140707-story.html.
173 Id.
174 It also protects those who provide abortion services and the countless other
individuals of varying genders and ages who rely on clinics like Planned Parenthood for
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Not only did abortion clinic violence decrease in the years when
buffer zones began to be introduced, but buffer zones help to
establish who has legitimate business inside clinics, and helps to
separate those individuals from ones who may wish to harass or
possibly harm them. The consequences of not protecting these
people from threats of violence are clear: protestors are
emboldened to harass and in extreme cases attack; patients
become uncomfortable and frightened; and for many, access to
abortion becomes difficult or unthinkable as a practical matter.
In the larger context of abortion hostility, this ruling can only
make things worse and continue to embolden protestors to use
extreme methods and harassment. It continues to signal the
Court’s reluctance to properly and vigorously defend the
fundamental right to abortion, which emboldens legislators to
infringe further on the already weakening right. Not only does
this strip women in Massachusetts (and possibly other states with
similar laws) of protections against intimidation, harassment, and
violence, but it adds to Supreme Court cases that chip away at the
foundations protecting abortion rights. This case throws other
similar buffer zones in other states into question, and allows
legislators to more easily reject or remove buffer zone protections
on the federal and state level. This changing attitude toward
buffer zones, previously so solidly protected by the Court, may also
contribute to increased harassment and violence against
protestors, as was seen in the 1990’s before such buffer zones
began to pass.
IV.

Conclusion

Every day, people from all backgrounds and lifestyles find out
that they or a loved one are pregnant. For many this is a time of
celebration and joy, but for many others it is terrifying. Whether
they are in situations of abuse, or in poverty, or have a mental
health condition making it impossible to care for a child, or were
raped, or simply never want to be parents, the idea of birthing and
raising a child is personal, and some circumstances make it the
wrong choice for many Americans. In a post-Roe world, most
other services, such as STD testing, cancer screenings and mammography, birth control,
family and interpersonal violence resources, and prenatal care.
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Americans rest easy with the thought that abortion is a legal and
protected right. Many do not see the regulations and attitudes that
creep slowly toward criminalizing abortion once more.175
These changes to the abortion jurisprudence are allowed under
many guises. From freedom of speech, to the “right to life” of the
fetus, to the many unnecessary regulations passed and allowed
because they are said to serve the state interest in protecting the
health of the mother,176 there is no shortage of interests states
have come up with to oppose and restrict abortion. But the one
interest that seems to be consistently forgotten is the interests of
the pregnant person. The fundamental right of a person to seek
an abortion is rarely discussed anymore, and though it seems to
be taken for granted, a close look at the state of abortion regulation
in America shows it is anything but secure.

175 Although abortion is still legal, women across the country have found themselves
jailed for abortions or even miscarriages based on draconian abortion regulation laws. See
Emily Bazelon, A Mother In Jail for Helping Her Daughter Have an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/magazine/a-mother-injail-for-helping-her-daughter-have-an-abortion.html (a woman secured abortion pills for
her daughter without realizing it was against Pennsylvania state law, and is now in jail);
Kate Sheppard, Mississippi Could Soon Jail Women for Stillbirths, Miscarriages,
MOTHERJONES
(May
23,
2013),
available
at
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/buckhalter-mississippi-stillbirthmanslaughter (a woman jailed under suspicion that she ingested methamphetamines,
killing her unborn fetus); Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Pregnant, and No Civil Rights,
N.Y.
TIMES
OP-ED
(Nov.
7,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/opinion/pregnant-and-no-civil-rights.html
(various
instances of women jailed for abortions and miscarriages); Jason Foster, Woman Faces
Charges of Killing Unborn Child During August Suicide Attempt, THE HERALD (Feb. 21,
2009), available at http://www.heraldonline.com/2009/02/21/1152282/woman-faces-chargeof-killing.html (a South Carolina woman jailed after a suicide attempt caused the death of
her unborn fetus); JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR BODIES, OUR CRIMES: THE POLICING OF WOMEN’S
REPRODUCTION
IN
AMERICA,
NYU
PRESS
84
(2009),
available
at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qffnc.7 (referring to a Louisiana woman who went to jail
on second degree murder charges for over a year before an autopsy proved she had had a
miscarriage).
176 Ultrasounds are an excellent example of this, as are requirements that abortion
providers have admitting privileges at local hospitals. Even though abortion is a thoroughly
safe procedure with a low risk of complications and both restrictions are considered
unnecessary by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, many states have
passed or considered such restrictions. Some states even regulate things like corridor width
in an attempt to covertly shut down clinics. See generally State Policies in Brief: Targeted
Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2015), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf; Jim Forsyth, Anti-Abortion
Group to Move into Shuttered Texas Clinic, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/us-usa-texas-abortionidUSKCN0IU2C920141110.
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The Supreme Court will have to revisit its decision in McCullen
v. Coakley, and unless it wishes to take this country in a new and
unprecedented direction,177 it will have to overturn the decision.
Free speech does not trounce other personal and fundamental
rights, and McCullen has continued a dangerous trend that has
put one such fundamental right gravely at risk.

177 Or rather, unless they want to drag us kicking and screaming back in the direction
we came from.

